 'power' and 'want.' 
Introduction
Plato's Gorgias enacts Socrates' discussion of the question "what is rhetoric" with the famous rhetorician Gorgias, and, in turn, with Gorgias' followers Polus and Callicles. But with each of his successive interlocutors, Socrates becomes, by degrees, less concerned with eliciting a definition of rhetoric, and more concerned with warning his interlocutors against the unjust manner of living that he takes to follow from the practice of rhetoric. The most dramatic shift in the topic of discussion occurs in Socrates' discussion with the young rhetorician Polus (466A4-472D7). In just a few pages, the focus of their exchange-which began as a disagreement about Socrates' account of rhetoric-shifts to such an extent that Socrates can now characterize their disagreement as about the question "who is happy (εὐδαιμῶν) and who is not" (472D).
1 This significant transition occurs over the course of a controversial passage in which Socrates argues that rhetoricians and tyrants have exceedingly little power in their cities because they do virtually nothing they want. The purpose of this study will be to examine these surprising claims in their context, so as more accurately to understand Socrates' argument for them.
At 466A4 Polus comes to the aid of Gorgias after he has heard Socrates claim that rhetoric is a form of flattery (κολακεία) that merely imitates justice (464E2-465A7). Polus objects, claiming that rhetoricians are clearly not regarded as flatterers (κόλακες): they are, in fact, highly esteemed for their tyrant-like power to kill whomever they want (ὅν ἄν βούλωνται), and to subject whomever they see fit (ὅν ἄν δοκῇ ἀυτοῖς) to the confiscation of their property and to banishment from their cities (466A4-C2). Socrates claims that Polus is really raising two different points, and distinguishes between them as follows:
[R]hetoricians and tyrants have exceedingly little power in their cities [...] because they do virtually nothing of the things they want (οὐδὲν γὰρ ποιεῖν ὧν βούλονται, ώς ἔπος εἰπεῖν), though indeed they do whatever seems to them to be best (ποιεῖν μέντοι ὅτι ἄν αὐτοῖς δόξῃ βέλτιστον εἶναι) (466D6-E2).
2
Interpreters of the passage have consistently treated Socrates' ensuing defense of this position as a combination of two separate formulations, 466A4-467A10 and 467B1-468E5, the former being an argument about power, and the latter, one about wanting. Because of the surprising and apparently paradoxical nature of the claims that these arguments defend, they have seemed to many interpreters either to be invalid or to lack a sufficient explanation of certain words that Socrates seems to use in unusual ways. So the scholarly work on this passage has either tried to demonstrate that Socrates' arguments are invalid or tried to explain and defend
Socrates' particular uses of the words 'power ' and 'want.' In what follows, I show that Socrates' arguments for these claims are valid, and that his use of the words 'power' and 'want' is completely conventional. I shall do so by considering the larger dialectical context and shall thereby hope to show that the primary mistake of earlier interpreters was to treat the tyrants and rhetoricians passage (466A4-468E5) too much in isolation.
Representative interpretations of Gorgias 466A4-468E5
What is usually considered the "first formulation" of Socrates' argument (466A4-467A10), which commentators have traditionally understood as an argument about power, is troublesome right from the start because Socrates seems to introduce and rely upon a special sense of the term 'power' as something that is good for its possessor per se. If this is true then Socrates' argument will only be tenable under this restricted use of 'power'; at the conclusion of his argument, he may have said nothing about the kind of power that rhetoricians and tyrants actually have.
A majority of the secondary literature, however, focuses on the second formulation and 'doing what seems best to one' to be tenable and interprets the difference between the two as a difference between acting in accordance with one's knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) and one's opinion (δόξα) respectively. 5 She takes Socrates' use of 'want' in this passage to be a technical one that she calls 'Socratic Wanting':
I (Socratically) want to φ only if my wanting to φ is linked to my recognition of the goodness of φ-ing; if it is a mere coincidence that I believe that φ-ing is the right thing to do and that φ-ing in fact is the right thing to do, my wanting to φ is not Socratic wanting. 6 Segvic justifies reading the distinction in this way by claiming "the contrast between doxa, opinion, and epistēmē, knowledge, is at the heart of the Gorgias as a whole." Philology, 103.2 (2008) , 109-34 at 112). He calls his interpretation of the argument "dialectic," by which he means an argument that uses premises to which the presenter is not himself committed, but which he uses for the sake of "dialectical expediency." Thus, Socrates' argument is not ad hominem because the premises that he employs represent conventional beliefs that an average interlocutor would hold, but Socrates' argument is not wholly alethic because Socrates is not himself committed to the conventional beliefs that he employs in the argument (see Wolfsdorf, "Rhetoric, " 112) . ISSN 1981 -9471 -FFLCH/USP www.revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga J. anc. philos. (Engl. ed.), São Paulo, v.11, n.2. p. 22-44, 2017 . DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981 makes no use of sophistical argumentation of the kind alleged, and that all of the elements necessary for understanding the position that Socrates adopts against Polus are spelled out in the greater dialectical context.
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I will defend my view by first offering my own interpretations of the two formulations before turning to what I take to be some key elements that arise in the greater dialectical context.
The way that I have divided up Socrates' argument is somewhat unconventional, but the advantage of a reading of the entire section it comprises is that Socrates' full argument will emerge to be not only consistent, but also to contain all of the elements necessary for understanding his position.
Rhetoric is not an art: Socrates' account of rhetoric and the "first formulation" of Socrates' argument (464B2-467A10).
In this section I discuss what is traditionally called the first formulation of Socrates' argument (466A4-467A10). To do so, I think we first need to consider briefly the passage that immediately precedes the first formulation, in which Socrates describes the difference between the four arts (τέχναι) and the four forms of flattery (κολακεία) that imitate them (464B2-466A3).
This passage has been largely passed over in discussions of the subsequent section on tyrants and rhetoricians (466A4-468E5). However, I take the opposition between justice and rhetoric that
Socrates sets forth in this earlier passage to be the basis of the position that he later adopts against Polus. Having first outlined this important opposition, I will then discuss the first formulation, and its apparent problems, which I take to disappear when considered in light of the preceding context. In a later statement directed at Polus, Socrates claims that he refuses to call rhetoric an art because it "has no rational account (λόγον) of the nature of the one to whom it administers (προσφέρει) or of the things it administers" (465A3-4). 11 E.R. Dodds, who is careful to notice the medical metaphor in Socrates' use of προσφέρει, paraphrases this as a claim that rhetoric "has no rational understanding of the patient or the prescription." 12 On this reading, the difference between justice and rhetoric, according to Socrates, is that justice is able to give an account of the nature of what is best (i.e., the general 'prescription' of these four crafts-see 464C4ff.) and of that to which it administers this treatment, the soul (see 464B3-8; 464C6-D3) . Rhetoric, on the other hand, thinks nothing of what is best for the soul, but, because it is pleasing, it nevertheless seems to be of great value to those who give no thought to justice.
The first formulation follows directly on the above-mentioned passage. It begins when
Polus takes over for Gorgias and objects to Socrates' account of rhetoric as flattery (κολακεία) on the grounds that rhetoricians are not regarded as flatterers (κόλακες). He argues instead that rhetoricians are regarded as having exceedingly great power in the city, because they, like tyrants, are able to kill whomever they want (ὅν ἄν βουλωνται), and to subject whomever they see fit (ὅν ἄν δοκῇ αὐτοῖς) to the confiscation of their property and to banishment from their cities (466A9-10; 466B4-5; 466B11-C2). Socrates, on the other hand, takes up the position that rhetoricians have exceedingly little power in the city-if, that is, by 'power' Polus means something that is good for the one who has it (466B6-7):
Polus' initial objection to this position has occasioned a number of interpretive difficulties. Polus cannot see why tyrants' and rhetoricians' ability to do whatever seems best to them is not evidence that they have the great power he has ascribed to them (466E3). Polus' working assumption in this objection seems to be the following:
(P) The ability to do whatever seems best to one is sufficient for having great power.
11 I accept Dodds' emendation of the text (see Dodds, Gorgias, 94; Paulo, v.11, n.2. p. 22-44, 2017 . DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981 Socrates undermines Polus' objection with the following argument:
(1) Great power is something good for the one who has it (466E6-8).
(2) It would not be good for one to do whatever seems best to one (which, on Polus' view, is to exercise one's power) without intelligence (νοῦν μὴ ἔχων) (466E9-12).
(3) Therefore, unless Polus can show that rhetoricians have intelligence, they do not have great power (466E13-467A6).
Socrates thus responds to Polus' objection by showing him that, given his own conception of power as something unqualifiedly good for its possessor, he cannot assume that rhetoricians' ability to do whatever seems best to them is sufficient for their having great power. If Polus is to
show that rhetoricians have power, he must "demonstrate that rhetoricians have intelligence (νοῦν ἔχοντας), that is, 13 that rhetoric is an art (τέχνην), not flattery" (466E4-7).
There are potentially two problems with Socrates' argument. First, his initial identification of power as something unqualifiedly good in (1), seems to be a serious weakness if he is introducing a special meaning of 'power.' As Penner has noticed, if Socrates introduces and relies upon a technical usage of 'power' his argument would only be valid for that meaning (sc.
'Socratic power'), so that, even when he is finished responding to the Polus' objection, rhetoricians and tyrants might still have power in some more ordinary sense of the word. 14 It is not, however, necessary to understand this view of power as a technical usage that Socrates introduces to trick Polus. Noticeable in this connection is Plato's care in having Socrates attribute this view of power to Polus:
[Soc] [T] hey don't have power if you say power is something good for the one who has it (466B6-7 Rather than arbitrarily restricting his use of 'power,' Socrates is gaining Polus' assent to one premise by appealing to Polus' own somewhat unreflective, conventional belief that power is something good per se. The argument that Socrates proceeds to make against Polus' objection 13 I read the καὶ epexegetically: Socrates claimed earlier that rhetoric is not an art because it cannot give a rational account (λόγον) of the things it applies or of the one to whom it applies them. On this reading, the present claim simply reinforces this earlier point: Socrates will not consider rhetoric an art unless Polus can show that rhetoricians in fact have the knowledge that an art requires.
14 Penner, 149. Secondly, a question might arise regarding Socrates' claim in (2) that doing whatever seems best to one-which on Polus' view is equivalent to exercising one's power-is not good for someone who lacks intelligence. In the Gorgias we get no explicit argument for this claim. It is, however, a familiar position that Plato has Socrates adopt and defend at length in other dialogues. Based on such parallels considered against the larger context in the Gorgias, I suggest that we may reasonably infer that the same sort of view is at work here. Perhaps the clearest example of such an argument is Euthydemus 278E3-282D3, where Socrates demonstrates for the sophists Euthydemus and Dionysodorus how he supposes they ought to "exhort the young man [sc. Clinias] to cultivate wisdom and virtue" (278D1-3). 16 The second argument (280B1-281B4), which shows that wisdom is necessary for the correct and successful use of good things, runs as follows:
(1) If we have good things (enumerated earlier at 279A8-B5 as bodily goods: health, beauty and other bodily needs; external goods: noble birth, power and honor; and psychic goods: self-control, justice, and bravery) we will be happy (εὐδαιμονεῖν), and do well (εῦ πράττειν) (280B5-6).
(2) These things are only good if they benefit us (280B7-8).
(3) The mere possession of these good things does not make them beneficial, it is necessary to actually use them (280B8-E3).
(4) However, the mere use of a good thing is not sufficient for it to be conducive to happiness; it has to be used rightly, because there is more harm done if someone uses a thing incorrectly than if they leave it alone (280E3-281A1; for more on the claim about harm see 281B4-D2).
(5) It is knowledge that directs our conduct in relation to the right use of these things (281A1-281B4).
15 Gregory Vlastos has argued that, while Socrates and Polus agree that rhetoricians have power in some ordinary sense of the term (i.e., that they have the power to kill, confiscate, and banish), in this first stage of argumentation Socrates shows that they do not have 'great power,' which Vlastos construes as power in the hands of a rational agent, acting rationally (see Vlastos, Gregory. "Does Socrates Cheat?" in G. Vlastos, Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher, (Cornell, 1991) , 132-156 at 148-9). For Vlastos, Socrates' argument against Polus' objection shows only that rhetoricians and tyrants do not have 'great power.' I think that this misconstrues Socrates' use of the term 'great power.' The term is used in this argument because this is the kind of power that Polus thinks tyrants and rhetoricians have, not because Socrates is trying to distinguish two distinct kinds of power. Polus and Socrates both refer to the power of tyrants and rhetoricians as 'great' because these men are conventionally regarded as having the greatest power of anyone in their cities (see 466B4-5) . The distinction is not between two kinds of power, but between degrees. 16 Socrates advances a similar view at Apology 30B2-4 and Meno 77B2-78B6. There does not, therefore, seem to be anything problematic in Socrates' appeal to the idea that knowledge is required for doing what seems best to one (i.e., on Polus' view, exercising one's power) to be beneficial (i.e., to count as power that is good for the one who has it). We can reasonably infer that Socrates has in mind something like this familiar view that knowledge, or intelligence, 17 is necessary for the correct and successful use of good things. But rather than simply showing that the rhetorician's use of power does not turn out well, in this context the argument shows that rhetoricians have no power at all, because Polus insists that power is 17 In this section of the Gorgias, the key notion constituting an art (τέχνη) is not ἐπιστήμη, as Segvic has argued (see Segvic, "Intellectualism, " 8 Paulo, v.11, n.2. p. 22-44, 2017 . DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981 something that is unconditionally good for the one who has it. It may appear that rhetoricians are exercising power when they submit whomever they see fit to the confiscation of property and to banishment from their cities, but this is not in fact power because rhetoric is not an art.
Rhetoricians who do whatever seems best to them do not have power-as Polus understands itbecause they do not possess the intelligence necessary for their doing what seems best to them to count as power that is good for the one who has it.
After Socrates has defeated Polus' objection, he transitions into a discussion about wanting. So far I have gone along with the traditional division of Socrates' defense of his position into two distinct arguments, but I would now like to challenge this view and explain how I prefer to characterize the relationship between these two stages of argumentation.
The transition from 466A4-467A10 to 467B1-466E5 has, at least since Olympiodorus' Paulo, v.11, n.2. p. 22-44, 2017 . DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981 (1) Whenever we act it is for sake of something 21 (e.g., we take medicine for the sake of health, or sail for the sake of wealth) and we don't want the thing we're doing, but the thing for the sake of which we do it (467C5-467E1).
(2) All things are either good (e.g., wisdom, health, and wealth), or bad (e.g., ignorance, sickness, and poverty), or in between these things (μεταξὺ τούτων-henceforth: "intermediate things"), things which sometimes partake in what is good, sometimes in what is bad, and other times in neither (e.g., sitting, walking, running, sailing, sticks, and stones) (467E1-468A4).
(3) When we do intermediate things, we do them for the sake of good things (468A5-B4).
(4) Killing, confiscating and banishing are intermediate things: when we do them, we do them because we suppose that they will be better for us (468B4-6).
(5) We don't want to kill, confiscate and banish unqualifiedly (ἁπλῶς ὅυτως); we only want to do these things if doing so is beneficial, and if they are harmful we do not want to do them (468C2-8) (from (3) and (4)).
(6) So, if one kills, confiscates or banishes, supposing that doing these things will be better when in fact they turn out worse, one is doing what seems best to one, and not what one wants (468D1-7) (from (5)).
(7) If power is something good, then such a person (described in (6)) does not have great power in his city (468D7-E3).
(8) Therefore, it is possible for one who does what seems best to one not to have great power nor to do the things one wants (468E3-5) (from (6) and (7)).
Questions most prominently entertained about this passage concern Socrates' use of 'want.' Interpreters tend to take his use of the word to be either inconsistent, or at least peculiar to this passage.
Kevin McTighe finds a logical inconsistency in the argument on the grounds that
Socrates allegedly equivocates in his use of 'want.' Socrates wins Polus' approval of his threefold division in (2) with health and wealth as his examples of good things, examples that Socrates, in other dialogues, claims are not actually good per se. 22 Because of this, McTighe has argued that when Socrates argues in (3) through (5) that we want good things, he is using 'want'
de dicto, i.e., employing a usage that fixes the content of the desire the way that the agent 21 It is important for the view I develop further below that Socrates is not here making a claim about actions for the sake of something else (ἕνεκα ἕτερου) but about actions for the sake of something (ἕνεκά του-see 467D7). The present statement does not commit Socrates to the claim that all actions are for the sake of something separate from the action itself. This statement only commits him to the claim that all actions are goal-directed. This leaves open the possibility that the thing for the sake of which an action is performed is internal to the action itself (i.e., performing an action might amount to a fragment of happiness; the action itself might be what happiness amounts to here and now). 22 As an example of a passage in which Socrates denies that health and wealth are good on their own, McTighe cites Euthydemus 278E-281E, (see part 2 above and McTighe, "Desire," 220). 25 For Wolfsdorf, Socrates intends (2) de re, that is, when Socrates tries to establish the threefold division of all things, he treats health and wealth as though they were real goods (Wolfsdorf, "Rhetoric, " 129) . This reading fails to capture the care with which Socrates distances himself from this view in attributing it to Polus. As Socrates did in the first stage of argumentation with respect to Polus' conception of great power (see 466B6-E8), here Socrates appeals to his interlocutor's conventional beliefs. The care with which he distances himself from the view suggests that, in both cases, Socrates speaks de dicto when he calls power, health, and wealth goods per se.
26 Roslyn Weiss, like McTighe, also thinks that this alleged equivocation is a reason for taking the argument to be invalid. While she takes the "first formulation" of the argument to be valid (see Weiss, "Killing," 301-303), she argues that, in the second formulation, Socrates initially appeals to conventional goods as the objects of desire, but by the end of the argument, he is arguing that we only want what is truly good (see Weiss, "Killing, [303] [304] [305] [306] [307] [308] [309] Socrates still has yet to tell us what the good thing is for the sake of which tyrants and rhetoricians kill, confiscate, and banish. And he still has yet to say why he thinks that rhetoricians and tyrants fail to attain this end for the sake of which they do these things. In other words, at 468E5, Socrates has not yet concluded his argument for his claim that tyrants and rhetoricians have the least power in their cities because they do virtually nothing they want.
To preface briefly the criticism I develop more fully below, we can already see that Paulo, v.11, n.2. p. 22-44, 2017 . DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981 argument of which the section just concluded is but one stage, that Socrates and Polus employ the same, completely conventional usage of 'want.' Both commentators thus neglect exegetical resources in the larger dialectical context that might allow them to construe Socrates' use of 'want' in such a way that would not require them to posit peculiar uses of the word that are not explicitly attested in the text.
Getting what you want and happiness (468E6-472D7)
In this section I show how the questions that remain unanswered at (what is traditionally considered to be) the conclusion of Socrates' argument are answered in the subsequent dialectical context. The exchange that immediately follows on the conclusion of Socrates' argument (468E6-470A8) is a digression from his defense of his stated position because in this exchange he responds to Polus' objection ad hominem: "As if you [sc. Socrates] would not want to be able to do what seems [sc. best] to you in your city rather than not" (468E6-7). A full treatment of the discussion that results from Polus' objection is beyond the scope of this paper;
for the present purpose it is enough to show how Socrates steers this digression back to a direct discussion of his position. For Socrates to properly answer this objection he has to first get clear about what Polus means by 'tyrant' (469C4). Polus says he takes 'being a tyrant' to be equivalent to being in a position to do whatever one sees fit (ὅ ἄν δοκῇ αὐτῷ), to which Socrates gets him to add the further qualification 'without being punished' (469C5-7; 469C8-470A8). In making such claims Socrates informs Polus that he has simply returned to his initial objection to Socrates' position (namely (P)), and thereby turns the discussion back to the topic at hand:
O surprising fellow, again it seems to you that if acting beneficially is in keeping with doing what seems [sc. best], it is good, and this, as it seems, is having great power; and if not, it is bad and having little power (470A9-12).
Socrates proceeds to ask Polus when he thinks that it is better to kill, banish, and confiscate-that is, when these activities are beneficial-but Polus refuses and has Socrates answer (470B1-11). It is at this point that Socrates finally reveals what he means by his claim that the killing, confiscating, and banishing of tyrants and rhetoricians are not in fact evidence of great power the way Polus assumes they are. Socrates' answer is that when someone does these things justly it is better, and when unjustly, it is worse (470C1-3).
Journal of Ancient Philosophy ISSN 1981-9471 -FFLCH/USP www.revistas.usp.br/filosofiaantiga J. anc. philos. (Engl. ed.), São Paulo, v.11, n.2. p. 22-44, 2017 . DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981 This claim is to be understood closely together with Socrates' claims about justice and rhetoric that precede the passage on tyrants and rhetoricians. As an art, justice aims at what is best for the soul (464C3-5). Actions performed justly will be therefore beneficial because justice aims at what is best. Rhetoric, on the other hand, "gives no consideration to what is best," and therefore has no understanding of what is beneficial for the soul (464D1-3). Socrates therefore thinks that rhetoricians do virtually nothing they want because he holds that they lack the expert (τεχνικός) attention to what is beneficial for the soul.
But a question now arises. Just what is this benefit that rhetoricians and tyrants want but fail to get and that practitioners of justice secure? Socrates' earlier claim that rhetoric gives no thought to what is best for the soul already suggests an answer, but the drama of the dialogue actually proceeds to reveal what both Socrates and Polus think it is through Polus' attempted refutation of Socrates' above-mentioned claim:
Surely, Socrates, it is not necessary to refute you by means of ancient matters. For things that happened yesterday and the day before are sufficient to refute you, and to prove that many people performing injustice are happy (ὡς πολλοὶ ἀδικοῦντες ἄνθρωποι εὐδαίμονές εἰσιν) (470C9-D3).
Polus challenges Socrates' claim (that killing, confiscating, and banishing are only beneficial when they are performed justly) by objecting that many who perform injustice are happy. The fact that Polus frames his objection in terms of happiness suggests that he understands this to be the benefit for the sake of which tyrants and rhetoricians perform their intermediate actions of killing, confiscating, and banishing.
Socrates takes no issue with Polus' understanding 'want' in this way. As he takes on Polus' criticism, he does not deny that happiness is the desired end in performing these actions; what he disputes is that these men actually become happy by doing such things unjustly. Socrates provides the following lucid analysis of their primary point of dispute in concluding his reply At 468E5, where Penner and Segvic conclude their interpretations, it was still unclear just what rhetoricians and tyrants wanted in their killing, confiscating, and banishing, and why exactly Socrates thought that they almost never attained it. By now, however, it is clear that it is for the sake of happiness that they do these things, and that Socrates holds that tyrants and rhetoricians performing these actions fail to achieve this end because they go about doing these things unjustly. Paulo, v.11, n.2. p. 22-44, 2017 . DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981 stronger claim that in every instance of desire, we want to act in accordance with a correctly envisaged scheme of means and ends that culminates with one's ultimate desire.
We can avoid making this leap by recognizing that Socrates' argument does not conclude at 468E5. In the larger context, it becomes clear that happiness is what tyrants and rhetoricians want and that they do not do what they want because their characteristic injustice renders them unable to realize the happiness they desire (i.e., they lack the capacity to recognize when a given action is best for the soul-see 464D1-3 happiness-see 470C9-D3), and why they fail to attain it (i.e., they kill, confiscate, and banish unjustly, that is, without knowledge of what is best for the soul-see 470C1-3; 464C3-5).
With a more complete picture of the argument now before us, we may summarize Polus'
and Socrates' positions as follows. Polus assumes that rhetoricians' and tyrants' ability to do whatever seems best to them (characteristically exhibited in their killing, confiscating, and banishing) is sufficient for their having great power and that their possession of this "power" is sufficient for their happiness (see 466E3; 470A9-12). Hence, he assumes that one can know with no further investigation that a person like Archelaus, or the Great King, is happy simply by their reputation for having power, with no consideration of how they stand in relation to justice (470D5-E5). For Polus, "power" (i.e., being able to do what seems best to one) is good all on its own and is constitutive of happiness regardless of the kind of person who possesses it. Socrates, however, thinks that rhetoricians and tyrants have exceedingly little power in their cities because they do almost nothing of the things they want; that is to say, they do not realize the happiness they desire because they kill, confiscate, and banish unjustly. This position is, yet again, informed by Socrates' conception of rhetoric as a form of flattery that merely imitates justice:
rhetoricians lack the art of justice, and therefore they do not know how to apply their "power" unless he is just; thus, when Polus exclaims that Socrates wouldn't even claim to know that the Great King is happy, Socrates agrees that he cannot know this simply by his reputation for power because he doesn't know "how he stands in regard to education and justice" (470E6-7).
A final note on terminology: Socrates has, in various places throughout his argument, used plural language to refer to various objects of desire (e.g., when he denies that rhetoricians However, rhetoricians and tyrants do not realize happiness (i.e., do not do what they want) when they kill, confiscate, or banish because they lack the art of justice (i.e., they lack the knowledge of what is best for the soul). Unjust tyrants or rhetoricians therefore only do what seems best to them because they lack the capacity to recognize when killing, confiscating, or banishing would count as an instance of doing what they want.
Conclusion
The aim of this study has been to show that Socrates' argument that tyrants and rhetoricians have the least power in the city is not only tenable, but that there is also no need to posit technical usages of the words 'power' and 'want' to make sense of Socrates' arguments. I have tried to show this by first providing my own interpretation of the first and second formulations of Socrates' argument, defending them against apparent weaknesses, and by then analyzing the subsequent dialectical context in which I take Socrates to complete his explanation of his position.
In part 2 I defended Socrates' first stage of argumentation in which he undermines Polus' assumption that the ability to do what seems best to one is sufficient for having great power (466A4-467A10). In this exchange, Socrates does not arbitrarily restrict his use of 'power', but rather, confirms Polus' quite conventional belief that power is a good thing in an unqualified sense and then qualifies this belief by showing that power is only actually good when it is accompanied by intellect and wielded by art (466E13-467A6). Socrates' argument leaves Polus with the burden of proof to show that rhetoricians have intelligence: otherwise, in doing what seems best to them, rhetoricians do not exercise power that is good for the one who has it.
Socrates' argument against Polus' assumption thus turned out simply to be a reinforcement of the Paulo, v.11, n.2. p. 22-44, 2017 . DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11606/issn.1981 position that he had already taken against rhetoric as a form of flattery in an earlier passage (464B2-466A3).
In still have yet to learn what it is that tyrants and rhetoricians want out of their killing, confiscating, and banishing, and we also have yet to learn why they fail to achieve this end.
The passage which I then discussed in part 4 reveals that both Polus and Socrates think that happiness (εὐδαιμονία) is the end that tyrants and rhetoricians seek in their killing, confiscating, and banishing, and that Socrates thinks that they fail to achieve this end because they do these things unjustly. This was then simply a recapitulation of Socrates' earlier claim that rhetoric is not an art, framed in terms of the rhetorician's failure to get what he wants. It is therefore because of their injustice that rhetoricians, like the tyrants they emulate, fall short of the happy life that they want. Although they are able to do whatever seems best to them, they do none of the things they want.
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